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In this paper Alfredo Ilardi and Blandine Laperche retrace the history and 
evolution  of  an  integrated  patent  system  in  Europe  and  explain  this 
development through the collective and global character of the innovation 
process  in  a  knowledge  based  economy.  As  the  Genesis  of  innovation 
depends  on  international  –and  regional-  links  between  several  actors, 
integrated protection systems are also needed. The authors also analyze the 
difficulties  of  the  harmonization  process.  Notably,  in  the  case  of  the 
Community  patent,  technical  difficulties  and  the  political  character  of  the 
protection of inventions are explained. To obtain better results in terms of 
innovation, it is necessary, according to the authors to link the reflection upon 
patent  law  harmonization  with  innovation  policies  and  to  transform 
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Patenting is an essential tool for the genesis of innovation, giving incentives to investments by 
enterprises and stimulating the creativity of a society. “The patent system added the fuel of 
interest to the fire of genius,” declared Abraham Lincoln.
1 Since its origin, it has been an 
entitlement to property  that is spatially well delimited, but the creation of specific patent 
systems in each country was soon considered as a barrier to trade. By patent systems we 
mean, referring to Lévêque and Ménière (2006, p. 11), “the set of institutions allowing the 
application of patent laws in a given geographic area.” The harmonization of patent laws (and 
more globally of intellectual property rights) has thus been a recurrent question since the end 
of the 19
th century (Ilardi 2005). In this chapter, we study the harmonization of patent laws in 
Europe, which includes the foreseen creation of an integrated patent: the ‘Community patent’. 
  
How can this willingness to harmonize the rules dealing with the filing and grants of patents 
to create a unique patent in Europe be explained? What has been the institutional history of 
the emergence of a unified patent law in Europe? We will argue that this history has been and 
is still paved with difficulties and is the subject of hard negotiations, which show not only the 
economic but also the political character of the property resulting from inventions. Finally, we 
defend the idea that the reforms of the patent system in Europe should be integrated into 
scientific and technological policies and that these, except in political declarations, do not 
seem to have sufficient priority within European economic policy to lead to positive results in 
terms of innovation. 
 
 
1. How can the emergence of an integrated patent system in Europe be explained? 
 
1.1. Roles and characteristics of patents 
 
It is nowadays widely acceptable to consider the invention patent as a major incentive tool for 
innovation and for the disclosure of scientific and technical information. The patent gives 
incentives to innovators because the exclusive right granted allows the patent holder to recoup 
his/her investment. It favours the dissemination of scientific and technical information, thus 
ensuring the cumulative character of the innovation process. On the one hand, the exclusive 
right is temporary and at its end the invention passes into the public domain and may be then 
used by everyone. On the other hand, the patent holder has to publish a description of his/her 
invention. The issued description must be sufficiently accurate so that a specialist would be 
able to reproduce it (Lévêque and Ménière 2003; Scotchmer 2004). 
 
However,  to  understand  the  emergence  and  the  stakes  linked  to  the  development  of  an 
integrated patent system in a regional area, and as far as we are concerned here in Europe, it 
seems important to stress two fundamental and linked characteristics of patents: first, since its 
origin,  the  patent  has  been  a  title  of  property  conferred  by  the  states.  Second,  its  legal 
evolution  and  the  economic  strategies  which  are  associated  with  it  show  that  patents 
symbolise the well-known adage according to which “knowledge is power” (Scientia potentia 
est,  Sir  Francis  Bacon).  The  first  privileges  that  share  some  characteristics  with  today’s 
patents  (exclusive  right  of  use,  disclosure  of  information)  appear  with  the  building  of 
European  states.  The  latter  were  first  of  all  cities,  as  was  the  case  of  Venice,  which 
promulgated in 1474 the first law protecting industrial property. The first privileges conferred 
on  inventors  aimed  to  attract  the  most  improved  techniques.  Scientific  and  technical 
knowledge and its materialisation in invention were considered as tools of economic and 5 
 
political power. The English Statute of monopolies, dated 1624, gave the possibility to protect 
an imported technique. In France, the royal privileges of the 17
th century were integrated into 
state  policy  for  development,  influenced  by  mercantilist  ideas,  which  notably  in  France, 
remained faithful to Colbert’s ideas of attracting the best technicians. The French revolution 
put an end to privileges but the Republic placed Property on the first rank of human rights. 
The French Patent Law of the 7 January 1791 protected national inventions and imported 
patents on national territory. The economic and political competition between states largely 
explains this fact as France, lagging behind Great Britain which was beginning its industrial 
revolution, was trying to catch up (Beltran, Chauveau and Galvez-Behar 2001; Hilaire Perez 
2000; Laperche 2001). 
 
Subsequently patents were limited to real inventions and no longer for imported techniques 
(the ‘importation patent’ was for example suppressed in France by the revision of 1844), yet 
the link between appropriation of inventions and economic power is still very important. For 
example, despite its limits, patents are still the key indicator to compare the capacity to invent 
of firms and countries (OECD 2002). Moreover, the recent evolutions of intellectual property 
rights, with the widening of patentability to new fields at the frontier of scientific discovery 
and invention (notably in the field of biotechnology) (Gallini 2002), show that appropriation 
(and thus patenting) is one of the elements of the strategic arsenal of enterprises. They use it 
as a defensive means of protection against imitations but also as an offensive tool, to create 
new markets, to define and impose standards and also to lure competitors (Laperche 1998). 
Patent  applications  for  biological  ‘inventions’,  ensuing  from  traditional  knowledge 
transmitted  from  generation  to  generation,  show  that  the  notion  of  novelty  is  sometimes 
understood  in  a  restrictive  way  (within  a  geographic  area,  or  according  to  a  mode  of 
expression, e.g. written versus oral, Mgbeoji 2005), according to the interest of states and 
their national champions (sees the debates on this question at http://www.wto.org).  
 
To  summarize,  since  its  original  conception,  patenting  has  been  a  territorial  right,  which 
means that a patent delivered in a country is in force only in that country. This territorial right, 
which has evolved to take on contemporary characteristics, has been used and is still used to 
affirm  the  industrial  power  of  a  country  and  of  its  firms  compared  to  their  competitors. 
However, efforts at harmonization started at the end of the 19
th century and have continued 
during the 20
th century and beyond.  
 
1.2. Harmonization and globalization 
 
Several reasons may explain the attempts to harmonize national laws on industrial property 
and  to  create  integrated  patent  systems  at  the  regional  and  international  level:  the 
globalization of economies and the affirmation of regional poles in the global economic area 
are  among  the  major  reasons.  It  is  possible  to  distinguish  three  main  steps  in  the 
harmonization of industrial property rights at the international and regional scales (we focus 
here on Europe), which correspond to important phases in the globalization of economies. 
 
The first step took place in the 19
th century when the first international conventions began, 
like  the  Paris  Convention  (1883)  for  the  protection  of  industrial  property  and  the  Berne 
Convention (1886) for the protection of literary and artistic works. The national particularities 
of industrial property laws were considered as barriers to trade, and this approach gained 
ground  at  the  end  of  the  19
th  century,  notably  thanks  to  the  development  of  means  of 
communication  (railways,  telegraphy).  In  this  period,  the  numerous  Universal  Exhibitions 
aroused  the  apprehensions  of  exhibitors  about  the  possibility  of  copying  the  exhibited 6 
 
techniques and stimulated international negotiations. It is to be noted that whereas the term 
‘globalization’ is a concept used to characterize today’s economy, it is however an old notion. 
The  first  phase  of  globalization  was  based  on  commercial  trade,  and  was  rooted  in  the 
constitution of nation-states and the discovery of new territories at the end of the 15
th century. 
At the end of the 19
th century a second step was taken to globalization, where not only trade 
but  also  production  developed  on  an  international  scale  (it  was  at  that  time  that the  first 
multinational enterprises were born). The end of the 19
th century was also characterized by an 
important liberalisation of markets and of financial flows between countries, which were then 
be partitioned off, even more strongly after the First World War (Bairoch 1993).  
 
The second period in the harmonization process of intellectual property rights began after the 
Second World War to the end of the 1970s. During this period the international system of 
patenting (the Patent Cooperation Treaty, PCT)
2 was created as an answer to the growing 
number of patent applications coming from abroad, and also the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO, established in 1967), today a specialised agency of the United Nations 
dedicated  to  the  promotion  of  intellectual  property  throughout  the  world  and  to  the 
administration of intellectual property treaties. It was also during this period that the European 
patent system (European Patent Convention)
3 was established, whose history is detailed in the 
second  part  of  this  chapter.  The  Bretton  Woods  institutions  (the  World  Bank  and  the 
International Monetary Fund) were created in the aftermath of the Second World War with 
the aim of reducing the barriers to trade. The role of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), signed in 1947, was to reduce tariff barriers between countries. The trauma of 
the Second World War led to the creation of common interests in Europe, to avoid conflicts. 
The European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) signed in 1957 built up a European economic area 
with  the  aim  of  promoting  economic  and  political  integration  among  member  states:  the 
creation of a free trade area would justify the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade, as is the 
case of intellectual property.   
 
The third period began in the 1980s and is characterized by the globalization of intellectual 
property rights, which culminated with the conclusion in 1994 of the Agreement on Trade 
Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  rights  (TRIPS  agreement).  This  unprecedented 
harmonization of intellectual property rights in all the member states of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO, which replaced GATT in  1995) corresponds to the third step in the 
globalization process, in which trade, production and finance are simultaneously integrated. In 
fact, the deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s has created a large interconnected 
market,  and  finance  thus  has  become  the  leading  point  of  globalization  (Chesnais  1996). 
Global firms are networked firms: their conception, production and commercial processes are 
directly organized on a global scale (Castells 2001; Andreff 2003; Chesnais 1996; Laperche, 
Galbraith and Uzunidis 2006). In this context, the globalization of intellectual property rights 
has become a necessity to secure their investments and their technology transfers (Maskus and 
Reichman 2004). 
 
The current stage of globalization, in which all three spheres of the economy are involved 
(trade, production, finance) is an important explanation of the need to harmonize the rules 
governing industrial property. The regional character of globalization adds an explanation of 
the  importance  of  integrated  patent  systems,  notably  in  Europe.  The  Triadic  character  of 
globalization,  according  to  Ohmae’s  work  (1985),  implies  that  economic  activities  (trade, 
material, immaterial and financial investments) are largely concentrated in three zones: the 
United  States  of  America,  Europe  and  Japan,  although  these  are  currently  broadening. 7 
 
Concerning merchandise trade, in 2005, 73.2% of European total merchandise exports (in 
dollars) were intra-regional and 31.5% of world merchandise trade flows were concentrated in 
the European zone (WTO 2006). The significant role played by the Triad in the economic 
activities – and within the Triad, of Europe – can be seen in foreign direct investments (FDI) 
statistics. Over the past decades, the share of the Triad in total world inward FDI flows and 
stocks has fluctuated at around 60-70%. The share of European Union in FDI inflows into the 
Triad was 75% in 2003-2005, compared to 62% in 1978-1990. In 2005, the European Union 
(including  the  eight  economies  formerly  classified  under  Central  and  Eastern  Europe), 
accounted for almost half of global inward and outward flows and stocks (UNCTAD 2006). 
The intensity of economic relations gives incentives for the creation of common institutions, 
notably in the field of intellectual property. In this line of thought, the resumed discussions on 
the Community patent in the 1990s go hand-in-hand with economic integration: “One market, 
one currency, one patent”, declared R. Goebbels, Minister of the Economy for the Grand 
Duchy  of  Luxembourg,  at  the  opening  of  the  hearing  on  the  Green  Paper  on  patents  in 
Europe, Luxembourg, 25 November 1997 (Schmiemann 1998). 
 
1.3. Harmonization, globalization and innovation 
 
Since the end of the 1970s and the questioning of the Fordist mode of production, innovation 
–  defined  by  J.A.  Schumpeter  (Schumpeter  1911  and  1942)  as  the  introduction  of  new 
combinations  of  productive  resources  (new  product,  new  process  of  production,  new 
organisation of production, new market, use of a new source of raw material) – has become a 
major element in economic competition (Porter, 1998) and of the economic growth of nations 
(as  in  theories  of  endogenous  growth,  see  Aghion  and  Howitt  1998).  In  contemporary 
economics, it is acknowledged that innovation needs a certain degree of monopoly, hence it 
needs patent protection (Schumpeter 1942; Laperche 2004), notably because of the particular 
characteristics of knowledge (partly tacit, non-rival, non-excludable and cumulative) which 
reduce the private return on its investment (Arrow 1962; Nelson 1959). Patenting is a key 
device to increase the private return on investment in knowledge, despite its limitations, even 
if it is not the only element useful for the promotion of knowledge-based economies (public 
investment in basic research, development of internal learning to create routines and to limit 
externalities of knowledge are some important devices to enhance the innovation capacities of 
firms and the appropriation by the firm of the knowledge it has developed).  
 
Establishing the role of innovation in economic growth (and thus the limits of Solow’s model 
of growth (1957) where technical progress is exogenous) has led in economic analysis to the 
development of studies aiming at a better understanding of the ‘black box’ of technology 
(Rosenberg 1982) and of the institutional forms involved in the genesis and the dissemination 
of innovation. The economists specialized in the field of technical change have worked since 
the 1980s on the nature and the role of institutions that, within the national framework, can 
promote innovation (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Edquist 1997). However, in the context 
of globalization, is the national level still pertinent to study the genesis and the dissemination 
of innovation? On the one hand, the answer is affirmative because the diversity of institutional 
arrangements in the field of innovation provides an answer to the relative strength of nations 
and enterprises which compete at the global level (Amable et al., 1997). On the other hand, 
with the harmonization/unification of some regional areas, as is the case in Europe, views 
have developed on the emergence of a European system of innovation, made up of ‘post-
national’ institutions dedicated to innovation (Caracostas and Soete 1997).  
 8 
 
However, one of the major elements of the functioning of an innovation system is the legal 
framework of accumulation, that is the set of rules and laws framing the economic activities, 
including innovation (Uzunidis 2003). The legal framework of accumulation is built by state 
intervention.  Three  main  policy  orientations  were  proposed,  firstly  in  the  US,  to  obtain 
improved  results  in  the  field  of  innovation  (Branscomb  and  Keller  1998):  1)  financing 
activities individually or collectively generating appropriable resources; 2) creating devices 
allowing  the  re-appropriation  of  the  private  return  on  R&D  investments;  3)  setting  up 
cooperation procedures between public and private entities in order to ensure the profitability 
of  private  investments  with  strong  positive  external  effects.  These  policy  orientations 
reflected  a  move  from  mission-oriented  programmes  to  distributed  science  and  diffusion-
oriented programmes. These aims have also been diffused throughout the world, notably in 
Europe (von Tunzelmann and Nassehi 2004). Concerning European intervention in the field 
of innovation, the first aspect has been achieved mainly through the framework programmes, 
together with other financing programmes. The third policy orientation has also received great 
attention  through  the  policy  of  network  building  (clusters,  commercialisation  of  public 
research, innovation collaboration). However the second aspect (creation of devices allowing 
the re-appropriation of the private return on investment in R&D) even if present as a major 
objective, has still to be improved. In fact, the measures pointed to by European policy to 
increase patenting activity for European enterprises are the encouragement of SMEs to apply 
for patents, the setting up of programmes to disseminate patent information, and policies to 
encourage public sector research institutions to apply for patents (Arundel and Hollanders, 
2005). The fragmented character of the European system of patents is not mentioned. This 
aspect  was  however  particularly  stressed  by  the  White  Paper  on  Innovation,  dated  1995, 
which noted the existence of common institutions dedicated to the stimulation of innovation 
in Europe and also noted their fragmentation. One of the recommendations of this report was 
thus to promote harmonization, especially in the field of intellectual property. We can link 
this recommendation with the revival of the Community patent in the 1990s (see second part). 
 
Knowledge-based economies are characterized by the necessity for firms to constantly renew 
their supply to meet a changing demand and also to contribute to the creation of new markets. 
This  ‘permanent  innovation’  (Foray  2004)  means  that  the  cost  of  innovation  is  on  the 
increase, as can be observed in the growing business expenses dedicated to R&D: among 
OECD countries, they grew by about 50% between the early 1990s and early 2000s, while at 
the same time GDP increased about 25% (OECD 2004). As a consequence, the management 
of innovation has been largely transformed. The innovation strategies of large enterprises do 
not only rely on the gathering of internal resources (human, scientific and technical, financial) 
but also on collaborations (the signing of contracts, including licensing) with other (small or 
large)  enterprises  and  other  institutions  (universities,  research  centres)  (Tidd,  Bessant  and 
Pavitt 2005; Antonelli 2005). The result is a “socialization of the formation of the enterprises’ 
knowledge capital” (Laperche 2007), which means that the firm’s knowledge capital (the set 
of resources gathered, analysed and used in the production process with the aim to innovate) 
is not built by a single enterprise but through a network of enterprises and institutions in close 
cooperation. These collaborations may be achieved at a global level but a large number of 
studies  show  that  an  important  part  of  R&D  investments  of  European  multinational 
corporations take place in the European area (Cantwell and Iammarino 2003). This is the 
same for R&D partnerships that usually have a regional basis. Hagedoorn (2002) showed that 
during the four last decades of the 20
th century, about 99% of R&D partnerships between 
companies  took  place  within  the  Triad.  However,  his  study  also  showed  that  intra-North 
American R&D partnerships were more numerous that intra-European ones and that the trend 
for  intra-European  partnerships  was  gradually  eroding.  The  reasons  may  be  found  in  the 9 
 
leadership of North America in science and technology and the attractiveness of this market. 
But it may also be explained, as far as Europe is concerned, by the fragmented institutional 
framework. However, this geographically designed socialization of the innovation process is 
another justification for the harmonization of intellectual property rights and the creation of an 
integrated system of patents in Europe. 
 
 
2. History of the Construction of an Integrated Patent System in Europe 
 
2.1. Early Attempts of International Harmonization of certain Aspects of Patent Laws  
 
The first three years of the 1970s were decisive in determining the present scenario of the 
international legal protection of inventions in general and in particular for the establishment of 
a European patent system. On 9 June 1970 the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) was signed 
in Washington and three years later, on 5 October 1973, the Diplomatic Conference for the 
adoption of the Convention for the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) 
(EPC) concluded its deliberations in Munich with the signing of the Convention. Both of 
these  international  instruments,  even  if  different  as  to  their  respective  legal  nature  and 
territorial scope, had their roots in the various attempts to internationalize different aspects of 
the industrial property system which took place at the end of the 19th century and successfully 
continued into the 20
th century. 
 
The field of trademarks was the first in which international harmonization efforts  yielded 
positive results. On 14 April 1891 the conclusion of the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International  Registration  of  Marks  set  up  an  international  trademark  registration  system 
which is still in force today. In the field of patents several factors delayed the achievement of 
a similar result until after the conclusion of the Second World War, even if the debate was 
gaining  ground.  At  the  turn  of  the  19th  century,  there  was  a  general  reluctance  among 
countries that were members of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
to depart from their well-established individual legal rules for the protection of inventions and 
enter into multilateral negotiations for the harmonization of their national patent systems. This 
attitude  was  enhanced  by  the  economic  crisis  between  the  two  World  Wars  and  by  its 
consequences for industrial development, which encouraged competent authorities, supported 
by interested circles, to maintain the ‘status quo’ as regards national patent laws. 
 
After the end of the Second World War, following the general restarting of industrial and 
commercial activities during the ‘reconstruction’ period, the attitude of national patent offices 
and  of  industry  started  to  change.  On  the  one  hand,  national  administrations  faced  a 
substantial increase in the burden of administering their patent systems due to the growth in 
the number of patent applications filed; on the other hand, the users of the system experienced 
difficulties in finding adequate responses to their needs in the existing patent legislations. 
 
This change of attitude manifested itself mainly in Europe, thus opening the way to the first 
attempt at setting up a European system for the protection of inventions. On 6 June 1945 the 
Agreement for the establishment at The Hague of the International Patent Institute, with the 
task of carrying out novelty searches in the field of patents, was signed among a number of 
European  countries.  This  Agreement  was  followed,  under  the  auspices  of  the  Council  of 
Europe, on 11 December 1953 by the Convention Relating to the Formalities Required for 
Patent  Applications  and  on  27  November  1973  by  the  Convention  for  the  Unification  of 
Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions. 10 
 
2.1.1. The 1962 Draft Convention on the Establishment of a Community Patent System 
 
However,  it  was  only  in  the  early  1960s  that  the  first  concrete  European  attempt  in  this 
direction  took  place  in  the  framework  of  the  1957  Treaty  Establishing  the  European 
Economic Community (EEC). The EEC Treaty does not contain common provisions on the 
protection of industrial property. It leaves member states free to adopt their own legislation in 
this field. In 1962, with a view to fostering the free movement of goods within the internal 
market,  thus  ensuring  that  competition  is  not  distorted,  a  draft  Convention  for  the 
establishment of a patent system providing for the grant of uniform protection to inventions 
throughout the Community was prepared. But in the early sixties, the European integration 
process was just taking its first steps and the achievement of such an ambitious legislative 
harmonization  project  soon  appeared  unrealistic.  In  1965,  the  preparatory  work  for  the 
preparation  of  the  Convention  was  interrupted  due  to  political  differences  among  the 
negotiating states. 
 
2.1.2. The 1969 Initiative of the EEC Council on the EPC and CPC 
 
A decade later, as a consequence of new developments in the commercial relations among 
European countries and of the increase in the number of patent applications filed in those 
countries, the debate on the need for setting up a European patent system was resumed. In 
1969, the Council of the European Communities endorsed the main guidelines which ought to 
govern the building of such a system. Two international instruments were foreseen: one with a 
broader territorial scope that would have been applicable to a larger number of European 
states; the other would have covered only the Community member states. The first of the two 
instruments became the European Patent Convention (EPC), the second the Convention for 
the European Patent for the Common Market (Community Patent Convention) (CPC), which 
was adopted at Luxembourg on 15 December 1975 and was amended on 15 December 1989 
by the Agreement Relating to Community Patents.  
 
The EPC entered into force on 7 October 1977, while the CPC never entered into force due to 
the lack of necessary ratifications. The EPC created a European ‘regional’ system for the 
protection  of  inventions.  It  applies  in  January  2008  to  34  European  states,  including  the 
member states of the European Community, which gradually joined the Convention.
4 It is 
administered  by  the  European  Patent  Organization,  with  its  headquarters  in  Munich.  The 
Convention provides for a single procedure for the grant of the ‘European patent’, which is 
valid for a period of 20 years and has the same effect as a national patent in each of the 
member states of the EPC. The processing of applications for the European patent, which 
includes  an  examination  and  an  opposition  procedure,  is  the  task  of  the  European  Patent 
Office  (EPO).  Together  with  the  Administrative  Council,  the  EPO  is  one  of  the  two 
constituent bodies of the European Patent Organization. The EPC provides a link with the 
PCT, so that applicants for a European patent may also obtain protection for their inventions 
in the member states of the PCT, via the PCT procedure. 
 
The CPC
5 was intended to transform the different national patent procedures of the member 
states of the European Community into one common procedure through which a single patent 
(the ‘Community patent’) would be granted. The CPC was implanted in the EPC and through 
the procedure provided in the EPC opened the way, upon designation of one or more member 
states of the European Community, to the grant of a supranational title for the protection of 
inventions, having effect in the whole territory  of the Community. To  this end, the CPC 
established within the EPO a number of special departments responsible for the acts of the 11 
 
EPO  in  respect  of  the  procedure  for  the  grant  of  the  Community  patent:  the  Patent 
Administration Division, the Revocation Division and the Revocation Board. Furthermore, 
with the CPC directly linked to obtaining the objectives of the EEC Treaty, the jurisdiction 




The non-entry into force of the CPC, mainly due to the high cost of the Community patent, in 
particular that of translation, and the highly complex judicial system foreseen, meant that the 
other Convention – the European Patent Convention (EPC) – designed with the CPC to set up 
a European patent system, was left alone to regulate the protection of inventions at European 
level. Indeed, since the date of its entry into force in 1977, the EPC has centralized – and 
continues to centralize – the procedure for the grant of patents for its member states and has 
proved to be a major factor in harmonizing the European national patent laws and in fostering 
the European economic integration process. 
 
2.2. New attempts in the 1990s to set up a Community Patent System 
 
However, notwithstanding the prominent role played by the EPC in forging European patent 
law, the idea of establishing an autonomous patent system common to the member states of 
the EEC was never completely abandoned. From the beginning of the 1990s, the debate on 
this project was kept alive among competent national administrations and ‘interested circles’, 
especially by the Commission of the EEC. But it was only towards the end of the decade, in 
1997,  with  the  Commission’s  Green  Paper  on  the  Community  Patent  and  the  European 
Patent System
7 that the initiative of setting up a Community patent was concretely launched. 
The Green Paper was followed in 1998 by a series of consultations which involved different 
bodies
8  of  the  Community  and  culminated  on  5  February  1999  with  the  adoption  by  the 
Commission  of  a  Communication
9  on  the  Green  Paper.  In  essence,  the  Communication 
contained the main elements of the structure of a future Community patent system. On 24 
March 2000, the European Council meeting in Lisbon officially endorsed the creation of the 
Community patent system.  
 
2.2.1. The Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent (2000) 
 
The decision taken by the European Council at the Lisbon meeting was followed on 1 August 
2000 by a Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent,
10 presented by the 
Commission. This proposal, as amended by successive modifications, still constitutes today 
the platform on which the negotiations for the establishment of the Community patent system 
are based. The declared aim of the Council Regulation is the creation of a supranational patent 
right applicable within the territory of the Community. The unitary character of this right is 
however conceived to coexist, on the one hand with national patent rights, and on the other 
with the European patent right as it stems from the EPC. This means that with the entry into 
force of the Community patent, patentees would have the choice between three alternatives 
when seeking protection for their inventions: the national patent, the European patent under 
the EPC and the Community patent.  
 
Together with the existing Council Regulations on trademarks
11 and on industrial designs,
12 
the  Regulation  on  the  Community  Patent  is  intended  to  complete  the  building  of  the 
Community industrial property system with a view to further enhancing the free movement of 
goods within the Community.    
 12 
 
The Proposal for a Council Regulation is composed of a Preamble and six Chapters: 
- Chapter I – General Provisions; 
- Chapter II – Patent Law; 
- Chapter III – Renewal, Lapse and Invalidity of the Community Patent; 
-  Chapter  IV  –  Jurisdiction  and  Procedure  in  Legal  Actions  relating  to  the  Community      
Patent; 
- Chapter V – Impact of National Law; 
- Chapter VI – Final Provisions. 
 
The Preamble deals with the relationship between the future Community patent system and 
the  European  patent  system  under  the  EPC.  This  is  a  focal  point  in  the  creation  of  the 
Community  patent  system.  The  relationship  has  a  particular  significance  in  view  of  the 
interconnections  between  the  two  systems  which  imply,  once  the  Regulation  on  the 
Community patent were to be adopted, ad hoc revisions of the EPC in order to render the two 
instruments  ‘compatible’.  In  essence,  the  main  points  covered  by  the  Preamble  are:  the 
performance by the European Patent Office of the function of granting and administering the 
Community  patent;  the  accession  of  the  Community  to  the  EPC  and  the  creation  of  a 
‘Community Intellectual Property Court’, which should have jurisdiction on matters relating 
to the infringement and validity of the Community patent, while Commission’s decisions 
should be subject of appeal before the Court of Justice of the European Community. 
 
Chapter I (General Provisions) establishes the Community patent law and sets the principle 
that it applies to the patents granted as Community patents by the European Patent Office. 
Furthermore, it specifies that the Community patent has a unitary character in the sense that it 
shall  be  valid  throughout  the  territory  of  the  Community,  and  shall  have  an  autonomous 
character in the sense that it shall be subject to the provisions of the Regulation. 
 
Chapter II (Patent Law) contains a set of substantive law provisions dealing with the rules 
governing the acquisition of the right to the Community patent, including the relationship 
between the employee and the employer, the scope of the rights conferred by the Community 
patent and patent application, and the situations involving the Community patent as an object 
of property, such as transfer, contractual licences, licences of rights and compulsory licences. 
It is to be noted that most of these provisions incorporate the content of the corresponding 
applicable provisions of the CPC, in the EPC and in the Agreement on the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement 1994). 
 
Chapter III (Renewal, Lapse and Invalidity of the Community Patent) deals on the one hand 
with the procedures governing the renewal, surrender and lapse of the Community patent and, 
on the other, with the grounds and effects of invalidity of the patent. 
 
Chapter IV (Jurisdiction and Procedure in Legal Actions Relating to the Community Patent) 
covers three procedural aspects when the Community patent is subject to actions. The first 
relates to actions concerning the validity, infringement and use of the Community patent. The 
Community Intellectual Property Court has jurisdiction in these actions and appeals may be 
lodged against decisions of the Court to its Chamber of Appeals. The second concerns actions 
which do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Community Intellectual Property Court, such 
as proceedings relating to the right to the patent between employer and employee. In such 
cases,  national  courts  of  member  states  have  jurisdiction.  The  third  covers  arbitration 
proceedings involving the Community patent, with the restriction however that they cannot 
invalidate a Community patent.  13 
 
Chapter V (Impact of National Law) sets out the prohibition of dual patent protection for the 
same invention by a national patent of a member state and the Community patent. The same 
applies to utility models and utility certificates, where such title is provided for by the national 
law of a member state. 
 
Chapter VI (Final Provisions) contains provisions relating to the establishment of the Register 
of Community Patents, the publication the Community Patent Bulletin and the adoption of the 
implementing Regulations.    
     
2.2.2. The Common Political Approach (2003) 
 
Since  its  presentation  in  August  2000,  the  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  on  the 
Community Patent has been the subject of intense negotiations, resulting in a large number of 
working documents
13 containing comments and amendments to the original proposal. It was 
soon evident that the main subjects requiring a compromise solution were those which had a 
direct bearing on the activities of the national administrations of the member states interested 
in  the  enforcement  of  the  Regulation.  They  concerned  the  structure  of  the  jurisdictional 
system of the Community Patent, the language regime applicable to the Community patent 
applications and patents, the costs for the maintenance of the Community Patent, the role of 
national  patent  offices  in  the  administration  of  the  Community  Patent  system  and  the 
distribution of fees among national patent offices of the EEC member states. 
 
A major step towards the conclusion of an agreement on those issues was made with the 
adoption  of  the  Common  Political  Approach  Concerning  the  Community  Patent
14  by  the 
Council  of  the  European  Union  at  its  meeting  on  20-21  March  2003.  On  each  issue  the 
Common Approach lays down the compromise solution achieved. 
- The jurisdictional system would consist of a Court of Justice having exclusive jurisdiction in 
actions of invalidity or infringement of the Community patent rights. The Court should be 
established by 2010. 
- The language regime provided for in the EPC would apply to the Community Patent, that is 
to say that applications for the Community Patent should be filed in one of the three official 
languages of the EPO. 
- As regards the cost for the maintenance of the Community Patent, it should not exceed that 
for an average European Patent. 
- The Community Patent system would be administered by the EPO in direct cooperation with 
the  national  patent  offices  of  the  member  states.  The  relationship  between  the  EPO  and 
national  patent  offices  would  be  regulated  by  partnership  agreements  which  would  set 
comparable standard of performance. Applications for Community Patents should be filed 
with national patent offices or directly with EPO. 
- Renewal fees would be shared between the EPO and national patent offices. 50% would be 
kept by the EPO to cover its costs; the remaining 50% would be distributed among national 
patent offices of the member states according to a distribution scheme established by the 
Council. 
 
2.2.3.  The  Commission’s  Proposals  for  Council  Decisions  on  the  Community  Patent 
Jurisdiction (2003)  
 
The Common Political Approach was followed few months later, on 23 December 2003, by 
two Commission proposals, one for a Council Decision Establishing the Community Patent 
Court and concerning Appeals Before the Court of First Instance,
15 the other for a Council 14 
 
Decision  Conferring  Jurisdiction  on  the  Court  of  Justice  in  Disputes  Relating  to  the 
Community Patent,
16 which further developed the issue of the Community Patent Jurisdiction, 
outlined in the Common Political Approach. This issue is one of the most sensitive in the 
framework of building the Community Patent system, because of its wide territorial scope and 
direct  impact  on  the  national  jurisdictional  systems  of  the  member  states.  The  proposals 
presented by the Commission set, on the one hand, the legal basis for the establishment of the 
jurisdiction and, on the other, for its conferral by the Council. 
 
The legal basis for the jurisdiction of the Community Patent Court is Articles 225a and 245 of 
the  EEC  Treaty,  as  amended  by  the  Treaty  of  Nice  (2003),  while  the  conferral  of  the 
jurisdiction by the Council is based on Article 229a of the said Treaty. The Commission 
document  proposes  the  setting  up  of  the  Community  Patent  Court  under  Article  225a, 
consisting  of  seven  judges  exercising  first  instance  jurisdiction  in  disputes  involving  the 
Community Patent. Within the Court, a Patent Appeal Chamber is established under Article 
225(2) to hear appeals against decisions of the Community Patent Court. 
 
2.3. Recent Developments 
 
Since 2003, in spite of the Commission’s efforts, few substantial developments have occurred 
in the project for creating a Community Patent system. The main result of these efforts was 
the preparation of a revised text
17 of the 2000 Commission proposal for a Council Regulation 
on the Community Patent. This text includes, on the one hand, the solutions proposed in the 
Common Political Approach and, on the other, those in the Commission’s proposal for a 
Council decision on the Community Patent jurisdiction.
18 However, no agreement has been 
reached so far on the revised text. One issue, in particular, seems to create serious obstacles to 
the rapid conclusions of the negotiations for establishing the Community Patent: the question 
of the cost of novelty searching and translating the Community patent into the languages of 
the EU member states.            
 
Notwithstanding the limited results achieved, the Commission continued to hold the view that 
“an affordable Community Patent would offer the greatest advantages for business”, and in 
this context launched on 16 January 2006 a consultation
19 open to all interested persons and 
entities, seeking views on the system of protection of inventions in Europe and asking to 
indicate what changes would be required to “improve innovation and competitiveness, growth 
and employment” in the Community member states. The consultation closed on 12 April 
2006. A considerable number of replies (2515 in total) were received. On 12 July 2006, the 
Commission convened a Public Hearing in Brussels, during which the responses received to 
the Questionnaire were discussed. 
 
On the question of the ‘Basic principles of the patent system’, the majority pointed out that 
the system should be improved and that a coherent European industrial property policy should 
be developed. The EPO should remain as the centre of the system, supported by national 
patent offices. On the question of ‘Harmonization and mutual recognition’, the importance of 
substantive patent law harmonization already achieved by the EPC and the Agreement on the 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (1994) was unanimously stressed, 
while the idea of ‘mutual recognition’ was generally rejected, due to the still ‘unequal value’ 
of  national  patents.  On  the  question  of  a  ‘Community  Patent’,  the  majority  favoured  the 
establishing of a Community Patent which should improve the present situation and should be 
a “unitary, high quality patent”. The features of the 2003 Common Political Approach were 
generally rejected due to the proposed language regime and the jurisdictional system. On the 15 
 
question  of  ‘Jurisdiction’,  the  majority  supported  the  Community’s  participation  in  the 
European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA) in view of its “practical and programmatic” 
approach and its clear procedural rules and low cost.  
 
In his speech in Berlin on 29 March 2007, the European Commissioner for Internal Market 
and Services, Charlie McCreevy, speaking at a conference on ‘A Europe of Innovation – Fit 
for the Future?’, referring to the results of the 2006 consultation, stated: “There was strong 
support for a cost-effective Community patent including sound litigation arrangements, while 
at  the  same  time  improving  the  current  patent  system  in  Europe.  In  October  2006,  the 
European  Parliament  supported  this  line  and  urged  us  to  explore  all  possible  ways  of 
improving the patent granting and litigation systems in the European Union. This calls for a 
combined effort by member states and the Community institutions”. 
 
In response to this invitation and in line with the opinion expressed by the majority of the 
replies  received  to  the  questionnaire,  the  Commission  adopted  on  29  March  2007  a 
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council entitled, Enhancing the patent 
system in Europe. 
 
After having noted that the present European patent system is more expensive than that of the 
United States and Japan, and that the existing litigation system is “unnecessarily costly” and is 
the  cause  of  “legal  uncertainty”,  the  Communication  focuses  on  two  main  issues:  the 
Community Patent and the Jurisdiction system, in an effort to propose compromise solutions. 
On  the  Community  Patent  issue,  the  Commission’s  Communication  underlines  that  the 
challenges  Europe  is  confronted  with  in  the  innovation  field  need  a  patent  approach  that 
should be both “affordable” and “legally secure”. This means that the criticisms expressed by 
the  majority  of  stakeholders  on  the  2003  Council’s  Common  Political  Approach,  mainly 
because the proposed jurisdiction system and language regime were considered “inadequate 
and unsatisfactory”, should be seriously taken into account.  
 
As to the translation costs, the Commission is of the opinion that it would be possible to 
reduce such costs, in particular to the benefit of SMEs, for example with “fee reductions for 
SME or schemes allowing flexibility in the translation requirements”. 
 
Concerning  the  ‘Jurisdictional  System’,  the  Communication  notes  that  opinions  were 
expressed,  on  the  one  hand,  in  favour  of  adopting  the  principles  of  the  European  Patent 
Litigation Agreement (EPLA) in the context of the EPC and, on the other hand, supporting the 
establishment of a specific Community jurisdiction for European and Community patents, 
based on the EC Treaty jurisdictional arrangements. On this delicate issue, the Commission’s 
Communication proposes a possible compromise solution inspired by the EPLA model and 
integrated by the principles of Community jurisdiction. 
 
In its conclusion, the Communication states that its purpose is “to revitalise the debate on the 
patent system in Europe, in a way to encourage member states to work towards consensus and 
real progress on this issue”. It is in this perspective that negotiations on the establishment of a 







3. Stakes and obstacles  
Whereas there are many reasons to explain the attempts at harmonizing the patent laws in 
Europe, difficulties continue to characterize the history of these harmonization efforts. They 
may  be  presented  as  the  result  of  technical  obstacles,  or  of  tensions  stemming  from 
contradictory interests, but also of inadequacies between innovation policies and the whole 
European economic policy.  
 
3.1. Costs and technical difficulties  
 
The claimed objective of the creation of a European patent was to reduce the cost induced by 
the filing of a patent in every chosen country. The centralised examination procedure at the 
European level would suppress the multiple examination procedures at the national level. The 
cost borne by the applicant is thus reduced. The filing and examination costs are paid at the 
EPO  and  only  the  grant  and  renewal  fees  are  to  be  paid  to  the  national  offices.  The 
examination criteria are centralised, which warrants the quality of the European patent. The 
latter can be demonstrated by the growing number of patent applications filed under the EPC. 
The number of patent applications filed with the EPO grew by 10% a year on average over the 
period 1995-2000 and, after a downturn at the beginning of the 2000s, the growth picked up 
again (OECD 2006). According to the EPO, the number of total filings rose from 181,000 in 
2004 to roughly 208,000 in 2006. This number of applications however seems quite low, 
compared with the number of applications filed with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office  (USPTO)  and  the  Japan  Patent  Office  (JPO),  each  of  which  registered  more  than 
400,000 applications in 2006.
20 The reasons for the difference are to be found in the market 
attractiveness, but also in differing standards and proceedings  (for  example in the United 
States, patents are more easily granted, notably in the field of biotechnology, software and 
business methods; in Japan, one invention can receive several patents). Some of the reasons 
are also related to the shortcomings of the European patent system.  
 
In fact, the rules governing the grant of the European patent present a number of problems. 
The first lies in the importance of the translation costs. European patents filed at the EPO have 
to be written in one of the three official languages of the European Union (German, English 
and French), but if the patent is accepted, the claims have to be translated into the other 
official  languages.  To  validate  the  patent  in  the  selected  countries,  the  patent  must  be 
completely translated into the language of each selected country. As a consequence, according 
to the European Commission, the cost of an average European patent (six countries, 18 pages, 
10-year term) reaches 32,000 Euros, including 7,000 Euros of translation and related costs, 
which represents 22% of the total cost (EPO 2006a). Of course, the higher the number of 
selected states, the more the translation costs would increase. This means for the applicant 
that  the  cost  of  a  European  patent  is  much  higher  than  an  American  or  Japanese  one. 
According to the consultancy company R. Berger,
21 a patentee from an EPC member state 
will  pay  an  average  of  24,100  Euros  to  have  a  Euro-direct  patent  granted,  while  a  US 
company will pay 10,250 Euros to have a patent granted by the USPTO, and a Japanese 
company will pay 5,460 Euros to have a patent granted by JPO (EPO 2006a, p. 139).  
 
The usefulness of this translation is subject to criticism by different sources, including the 
EPO itself (EPO 2006b), because while its rationale is to promote the disclosure of scientific 
and technical information, the waiting period for the translation is very long (on average three 
or four years after filing). The benefits of the disclosure are thus reduced, notably in sectors 
where technical developments are rapid. Moreover, because of the translation costs, patents 
are more easily filed by big enterprises, richer in financial resources, and conversely hinder 17 
 
the innovation capacity of SMEs, which account for 99.8% of the total number of European 
enterprises. Finally, the importance of translation costs induces the applicants to reduce the 
number of countries selected for a European patent. According to the EPO (2006a), European 
patents are generally valid in (only) six countries; most frequently Germany, the UK, France, 
Italy, Spain and Switzerland.  
 
Another important problem in connection with the granting of European patents lies in the 
need to defend the patent in each country in case of counterfeiting, which increases the cost of 
protection  under  the  European  patent  system,  as  well  as  the  uncertainty  stemming  from 
decisions that may differ according to the rules in force in the different states (also due to 
protectionist attitudes of any state tempted to favour national enterprises).  
 
3.2. Divergent interests 
 
The  Agreement  on  the  Application  of  Article  65  of  the  EPC  (London  Agreement)  of  17 
October 2000 (London Agreement) aiming at reducing the translation cost of the European 
patent, the draft of the European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA) and the Community 
Patent,  should  reduce  to  a  large  extent  the  difficulties  existing  in  the  framework  of  the 
European patent system. The London Agreement has been ratified by France and the relevant 
instrument has been deposited on 29 January, 2008 which means that the Agreement will 
enter into force on May 1, 2008.  
 
According to Lévêque and Menière (2006, p. 19), a major point to put forward in the difficult 
harmonization process of industrial property rights in Europe is the role played by groups 
opposed  to  the  reforms:  “The  most  concerned  interest  group  is  the  applicants,  mainly 
composed of enterprises, for which the reforms aiming at the reduction of translation costs are 
positive.  Other  interest  groups  are  negatively  hit  by  the  reforms.  This  is  the  case  of  the 
national patent offices and of consultants in intellectual property in charge of the designation 
of the European patent in the different countries. Some national applicants may be added to 
this category, benefiting from a protectionist judicial system.” According to these authors, the 
enterprises’ group, fragmented, large and heterogeneous, does not actively take part in the 
reforms,  whereas  the  opposed  groups,  smaller  and  more  homogeneous,  do  influence  the 
reforms more effectively. For the Community Patent, the preservation of the national offices’ 
revenue is an answer to the influence of this interest group, while limiting its reach. 
 
The coexistence of national, European  and Community patents may create overlap in the 
procedures to seek patent protection in Europe and thus increase the costs borne by applicants 
(due to the necessity to compare the cost and profit of each system). It may also give rise to a 
competition between national offices and the EPO, to preserve their interests and revenues, to 
the detriment of innovation incentives. The complementarity between the EPO and national 
offices, foreseen in the Community patent, could reduce this risk.   
 
Finally, another argument advanced by Lévêque and Ménière (2006) refers to the creation of a 
specialised Court which may have an impact on the level of patent protection. The authors 
take  the  example  of  the  United  States  patent  system,  where  the  creation  of  the  Court  of 
Appeal of the Federal Circuit has led to judgements favourable to patent holders, and thus to a 
stronger appropriation of invention as a consequence of widening patentability conditions (see 




3.3. European Policy 
 
A  third  argument  may  be  added  to  explain  the  current  difficulties  incurred  by  the 
harmonization of patent laws in Europe: that is the contrast existing between on the one hand, 
a restrictive monetary policy and the constraints of the budgetary policy (i.e. the Maastricht 
criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact) and the important element of irreducible expenses 
(e.g. expenses due to people ageing), and on the other hand, the ambitious aims in terms of 
innovation (von Tunzelmann 2004). We can recall that in 2000, the Lisbon European Council 
placed R&D at the centre of innovation-based policies to meet the goal of Europe becoming 
the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”. To reach that 
aim, the Barcelona European council set a target for European R&D intensity of 3% by 2010, 
with two-thirds of the R&D to be contributed by the business sector, which at mid-term of the 
deadline seemed highly unrealistic,
22 notably because of the previously mentioned macro-
economic constraints. 
 
Moreover,  it  is  now  well  known  that  the  increase  in  R&D  expenditures  does  not 
systematically mean better results in terms of innovation. It is the whole innovation system 
(its strength, clarity and organisation of institutions) which has to be involved to obtain better 
results.  However,  in  this  beginning  of  the  21
st  century,  the  debates  dealing  with  the 
construction of an innovation system at the European level are not at the forefront of the 
public  agenda,  as  it  was  the  case  at  the  end  of  the  1990s,  because  of  the  successive 
enlargements of the EU, of the ways that European decisions are taken (unanimity), but also 
of the central place that monetary and budgetary policies have taken in the framework of the 
European political approach. Scientific and technological policies, which focus more on the 
creation of networks (interactions with local environment, users’ needs) than on voluntary 
policies, are an illustration of this insufficient attention (in terms of budget support) given to 
innovation. Weak results in European scientific production and in industrial performance are 
the result of this contradiction (Dosi et al. 2006).   
 
We can consider that the slowness of the harmonization of European intellectual property 
rules  also  results  from  the  contradiction  and  the  fragmentation  of  European  policies.  For 
example, in a recent book, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007, p. 3) argue 
that the reforms of the European patent system should not be only an issue dealt with by legal 
scholars and that the Economic dimension should be reinforced: “The patent system will not 
change before legal scholars, who shape it, have acknowledged the economic dimension of 
their activity, and before economists have adapted their reasoning to the specific institutional 
and legal context of patents.” The legal approach focuses in fact on “issues of fairness and 
balance of rights, of consistency of patent law with other bodies of laws” (ibid.), but does not 
take enough account of the “utilitarian role of patents”, which refers to their benefits for 
society (encouragement and diffusion of innovation) and to their costs (monopoly, restriction 
on use of inventions). Also, the difficult setting up of a European innovation system, in which 
the legal framework (including IPRs) play a central role, can also be considered, and crucially 
so, as the result of the weak integration of economic and technological policies and of the 
insufficiently voluntary character of European scientific and technological policy.  
 
 
4. Elements of a conclusion 
 
Despite  the  numerous  and  pertinent  reasons  that  justify  the  harmonization  of  European 
intellectual property rules and the creation of an integrated patent system in Europe, various 19 
 
difficulties  hinder  this  process.  The  latter  are  related  to  technical  obstacles,  to  interest 
conflicts  that  in  the  last  analysis  show  up  the  national  character  of  this  property  title, 
conceived  since  its  origin  to  promote  national  interests.  In  a  context  of  liberalisation  of 
markets, ‘neomercantilist’ practices, aimed to protect and support national industries, did not 
disappear  (Uzunidis  and  Laperche  2004).  The  difficult  emergence  of  an  integrated  patent 
system in Europe supports this argument: making concessions in this field is considered as 
abandoning  national  sovereignty.  Moreover,  the  orientation  of  European  policy,  built  on 
macroeconomic equilibrium, induces the rationalisation (if not the reduction) of expenditures. 
This leads to a focus on short-term results, seemingly a priority in the orientation of scientific 
and  technological  policies:  through  networks,  the  scientific  production  will  quickly  be 
transformed into marketable artefacts. But it is also the case for constructing an integrated 
patent  system.  The  efficiency  of  patents  relies  on  a  fair  balance  between  protection  and 
diffusion of scientific and technological information. If the relations of power are favourable 
to  the  enlargement  of  patentability  and  to  the  reinforcement  of  the  protection  granted  to 
applicants,  the  quality  of  the  European  intellectual  property  system  will  be  reduced.  A 
perverse effect for the promotion of innovation could ensue from this scenario, as has been 
stressed for the case of the United States (Gallini 2002). The harmonization of intellectual 
property laws and the creation of an integrated patent system in Europe are intrinsically linked 
to the European scientific and technological policies. To achieve positive results in this field, 
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NOTES 
 
1 Quoted by USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov. Abraham Lincoln is the only US President who was granted a patent 
(Patent N°6469 for “a device for buoying Vessels over Shoals”).  
2 The PCT is an international treaty conceived to simplify the procedure for the grant of patents when protection 
is sought in several countries at the same time. 
3 The EPC is a regional treaty setting up a European patent system, providing for substantive rules for the grant 
of a European industrial property title – the European Patent – valid in all members States of the Convention. 
4 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,  Liechtenstein,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the 
Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland, 
Turkey, the UK. 
5 The CPC was signed in Luxembourg on 15 December 1975 by the following states: Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the UK; it was amended on 
15 December 1989 by the Agreement Relating to the Community Patent. 
6 The 1989 Agreement amending the CPC included a Protocol on the settlement of litigations concerning the 
infringement and validity of the Community patent. 
7 Green Paper on the Community Patent and the European Patent System (COM (97) 314 final, 24 June 1997). 
8 The Economic and Social Council (OJ C 129, 27.4.1998, p.8) and the European Parliament (OJ C 379, 
7.12.1998, p. 268). 
9 Communication on the follow-up to the Green Paper on the Community Patent and the Patent System in 
Europe (COM (99) 42 final, 5 February 1999).. 
10 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent (COM (2000) 412 final, 1 August 2000). 
11 Council Regulation No 40/90EEC of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, OJ L 11, 14.1.1994, 
p.1 
12 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on Community Design of 21 June 1999 (COM (1999) 310 final) 
13 See, in particular: Opinion of the Economic and Social Council on the ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
the Community Patent’ (CES/2001/411); Commission Staff Working Paper: ‘A Community policy for the 
realization of the Community Patent in the context of a revision of the European Patent Convention’ 
(SEC/2001/744 final); Commission Working document on the planned Community Patent jurisdiction 
(COM(2002) 480 final. See also the following revised texts of the ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
Community Patent’: the Presidency – document 8539/03; the Presidency – document 10404/03 (PI 53); the 
Secretariat of the Council – document 10728/03; the Secretariat of the Council – document 14233/03; the 
Secretariat of the Council – document 15086/03. 22 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
14 Common Political Approach Concerning the Community Patent (EU Council document 7159/03, 7 March 
2003). 
15 Proposal for a Council Decision Conferring Jurisdiction on the Court of Justice in Disputes in Disputes 
relating to the Community Patent (COM (2003) 227 final, 23 December 2003). 
16 Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing the Community Patent Court and Concerning Appeals Before the 
Court of First Instance (COM (2003) 228 final, 23 December 2003). 
17Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent (Revised Text) (Presidency of the EU Council, 
7119/04, 8 March 2004). 
18 See above Notes 13, 14 and 15, respectively. 
19 EU Commission, Questionnaire on the Patent System in Europe, 9 January 2006. 
20 httpp://www.epo.org/focus/patent-system/patents-around-the-world.html, last updated: 5.4.2007. 
21 In 2004, the EPO decided to update and complement former cost estimates. For that purpose, it commissioned 
a survey of applicants and attorneys which was carried out by a consultancy company: Roland Berger Market 
Research, see EPO (2006a). 
22 The study conducted by  Arundel and Hollander for the  European Union – based on the 13 countries of 
European Union that account for 95.4% of total business expenditures for research and development (BERD) 
among the EU25 countries in 2002 and 93% of GDP – showed that “the EU could only achieve a BERD 
intensity of 2% by 2015 if the R&D intensity of all sectors in all countries grew at the highest growth rate 
observed in each sector (…) We conclude that the 2% BERD intensity goal is unrealistic and unachievable by 
2015. It would require massive and economically painful changes in the structural distribution of sectors within 
Europe” (Arundel and Hollander 2005, p. 31). 